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INTRODUCTION

Establishing legal mechanisms to ensure fair opportunity for handicapped citizens to obtain employment is a comparatively new goal of
American jurisprudence. Not until 1948, when Congress amended the
Civil Service Act to prohibit civil service agencies from unfairly discriminating against the handicapped,' was there any statutory law addressing
such employment discrimination.2 Since that time, significant progress has
been made, evidenced by the passage of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,' as
1. See 5 U.S.C. § 7153 (1982) (1948 amendment to Civil Service Act).

2. See Bayh, Foreword to the Symposium Issue on Employment Rights of the Handicapped,27 DE PAUL L. REV. 943, 943 (1978).

3. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355-94 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793, 794 (1982)). Title V of the Act, of which the key sections are 501,
503, and 504, sets forth the proscribed discriminatory practices. See id §§ 501, 503, 504, 87
Stat. at 390-94 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793, 794 (1982)). Section 501
requires affirmative action on the part of federal agencies to employ and advance handi-
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well as numerous state statutes aimed at ensuring fair employment of the
handicapped.
There may be as many as fifty million handicapped Americans, depending on how "handicap" is defined.' While traditional definitions confine
the class to those with such disabilities as blindness, deafness, and ambulatory handicaps, broader definitions tend to include persons suffering from
mental retardation, heart conditions, diabetes, and even drug and alcohol
addiction. 6 Discrimination, like handicap, is a concept that eludes easy
definition. Employment discrimination against handicapped persons
sometimes takes the form of intentional, invidious discrimination based on
social bias.7 But more often, handicapped persons are denied employment
capped persons. See id. § 501, 87 Stat. at 390-91 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 791
(1982)). Section 503 requires federal contractors to engage in affirmative measures to promote hiring of the handicapped. See id § 503, 87 Stat. at 393-94 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 793 (1982)). Section 504 of the Title mandates that recipients of federal funding
refrain from discriminating against the handicapped. See id. § 504, 87 Stat. at 394 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982)).
4. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940 (Deering Supp. 1984) (proscribing unfair employment discrimination based on "physical handicap"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, §§ 1-101 to
2-105 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985) (Illinois Human Rights Act prohibiting employment
discrimination against the handicapped); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.31-.395 (West Supp. 19831984) (Wisconsin Fair Employment Act proscribing handicap employment discrimination).
While most states have enacted some guidelines, commentators have long been calling for
omnibus civil rights acts for the handicapped. See ten Broek, The Right to Live in the WorldThe Disabledin the Law of Torts, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 841, 843 (1966) (advocating more comprehensive laws that facilitate complete integration of handicapped into society); Note,
Abroad in the Land: Legal Strategiesto Effectuate the Rights of the Physically Disabled,61
GEO. L.J. 1501, 1522 (1973) (calling for broad legislation ensuring rights of handicapped).
5. See S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 34, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 6373, 6400 (number of handicapped Americans range from estimates of 28 to 50
million persons).
6. See Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-Mental Retardation Comm'n, 704 F.2d 1402,
1408 (5th Cir. 1983) (mental disability clearly handicap under Rehabilitation Act);
Smithberg v. Merico, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 80, 83 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (heart condition "physical
handicap" within meaning of California employment discrimination statute); Fraser Shipyards, Inc. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1809, 1810 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1976) (diabetic is handicapped under Wisconsin law); Comment, Hidden Handicaps. Protection ofAkcoholics, DrugAddicts, and the Mentally Ill Against
Employment DiscriminationUnder the RehabilitationAct of 1973 and the Wisconsin FairEmployment Act, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 725, 725 (defining alcoholism and drug abuse as "hidden
handicaps" not readily apparent); see also Bayh, Forewordto the Symposium Issue on Employment Rights ofthe Handicapped,27 DE PAUL L. REV. 943, 945 (1978) (legislative history
and administrative regulations reflect Congress' intent that definition of handicap be construed broadly).
7. See Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 305 n.19 (5th Cir. 1981)
(intentional social bias discrimination victimizes handicapped as it does racial, sexual, and
religious minorities); accord Bayh, Foreword to the Symposium Issue on Employment Rights
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because of unfair job qualifications they cannot meet, 8 or because of fair
qualifications they would be able to meet if employers would make some
reasonable accommodations. 9 Each form of discrimination is threatening
and must be addressed carefully by legislators and judges.
In Texas, the Commission on Human Rights Act went into effect in September of 1983."0 This legislation establishes a comprehensive scheme for
both administrative'' and judicial 2 enforcement of the rights guaranteed

of the Handicapped,27 DE PAUL L. REV. 943, 944 (1978) (recounting 1975 New York Times
report of employer's refusal to hire man as truck driver because he stuttered).
8. See Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 305 (5th Cir. 1981) (describing this form of discrimination as "disparate impact" discrimination). The Prewitt court
explained that if a handicapped job applicant could have satisfactorily performed the job
without any workplace accommodation by the employer, but was turned down because his
handicap rendered him unable to satisfy neutral hiring standards, then he is entitled to relief. See id at 305. Neutral hiring standards are standards not intended to have disparate
impact, but in fact do. The court further recognized that commentators have identified discrimination resulting from "neutral standards with disparate impact" as a barrier commonly
confronted by handicapped applicants. See id at 305 n. 19. The notion of disparate impact
discrimination, as applied in Prewitt, is derived from cases involving other types of discrimination. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-31 (1977) (job qualification requiring that employees weigh 120 pounds violates Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 if
women are disproportionately excluded and requirement not necessary for job performance); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (employer requiring written tests
and high school diploma violated Title VII since criteria, disproportionately excluding
blacks, not job related); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 612 F.2d
644, 649-50 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding unlawful public school policy of excluding handicapped
children from regular classes absent showing of necessity).
9. See, e.g., Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 305 (5th Cir. 1981)
(evidence that plaintiff could have satisfactorily performed job had employer simply lowered shelf legs); Nelson v. Thornburgh, 567 F. Supp. 369, 380 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (blind employee could satisfactorily perform job if provided reader or certain electronic devices);
Crane v. Lewis, 551 F. Supp. 27, 31 (D.D.C. 1982) (air traffic controller may have performed
well with accommodation of hearing aid or telephone amplification device). Such discrimination is referred to as "surmountable barrier" discrimination. See Prewitt v. United States
Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 305 (5th Cir. 1981) (surmountable barrier discrimination exists
when handicapped employee could perform job satisfactorily if employer would make reasonable accommodations).
10. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k (Vernon Pamph. Supp. 1984). The new
act replaces a prior statute pertaining to employment rights of the handicapped which was
far less comprehensive than the new one. See id art. 5221k, § 10.03 (provision in new act
authorizing repeal of prior statutes); see also Act of May 29, 1975, ch. 352, § 2, 1975 Tex.
Gen. Laws 939 (codified at TEX. HUM. REs. CODE ANN. § 121.003(f) (Vernon 1980)), repealed by Act of July 7, 1983, ch.7, § 10.03(c), 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws, Gen. & Spec. 37, 57
(codified as Commission on Human Rights Act, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k,
§ 10.03(c) (Vernon Pamph. Supp. 1984)).
11. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 522 1k, § 6.01 (Vernon Pamph. Supp. 1984).
12. See id § 7.01.
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by the Act.I3 Its aim is to prohibit employment discrimination based not
only upon handicap, but upon race, color, religion, sex, age, and national
origin as well. 14 This comment discusses various aspects of the Act as it
pertains exclusively to discrimination based on handicap. Particular attention is focused on determining who is an "otherwise qualified" handicapped individual and on the duty of employers to provide "reasonable
accommodation." Federal constitutional and statutory protections of the
handicapped person's right to fair employment are examined first. An
overview of the new Texas act is then presented, followed by an analysis of
the Texas statute in light of the federal law.
II.

A.

FEDERAL LAW

Constitutional

Constitutional challenges to handicap discrimination ordinarily fail because the handicapped generally do not constitute a "suspect class" as defined by opinions construing the fourteenth amendment's equal protection
clause.' 5 Moreover, courts recognize that since the passage of Title V of
13. See id. §§ 5.01-.10.
14. See id. §§ 5.0 1-.10; see also id § 1.02(1) (explaining general purpose of Act as executing policies of federal Civil Rights Act of 1964). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
unfair discrimination against all classes covered by Texas' new act, except age and handicap.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982) (prohibiting employment discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin). Federal proscriptions of employment discrimination
against the handicapped, to the extent they exist, are contained in the Rehabilitation Act of
1973. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793, 794 (1982) (federal agencies, contractors, and recipients of
funding prohibited from discriminating unfairly against the handicapped).
15. See, e.g., Brown v. Sibley, 650 F.2d 760, 766 (5th Cir. 1981) (handicapped persons
do not constitute suspect class); Massachusetts Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities v. Civil
Defense Agency, 649 F.2d 71, 76-77 (1st Cir. 1981) (handicapped not suspect class); Carmi v.
Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 620 F.2d 672, 676 n.9 (8th Cir.) (handicapped not suspect class for equal protection purposes), cert. denied,449 U.S. 892 (1980); see also Upshur v.
Love, 474 F. Supp. 332, 336-38 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (handicapped not suspect class). But see,
e.g., Panitch v. Wisconsin, 444 F. Supp. 320, 322 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (equal protection clause
guarantees handicapped school children right to public education); Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405
F. Supp. 946, 958-59 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (dictum that handicapped persons are suspect class for
equal protection purposes); Special Educ. Div. v. G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441, 447 (N.D. 1974)
(handicapped constitute suspect class in terms of equal protection); see also Gurmankin v.
Costanzo, 556 F.2d 184, 186-88 (3rd Cir. 1977) (discrimination based on handicap violates
due process clause under "irrebutable presumptions" theory). See generally Burgdorf &
Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment.: The Qualificationsof HandicappedPersons as a
"Suspect Class" Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 855, 905-08
(1975) (urging that handicap status meets all elements required of suspect class). The equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment mandates "[n]o state shall make or enforce
any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. In arguing that a law or practice classifies and
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B.

Statutory.- The Rehabilitation Act of 1973

Under Title V, Congress created a three-part program to prohibit handicap discrimination.' 8 First, section 501 (later codified at 29 U.S.C. § 791)
prohibits the federal government from engaging in unfair employment discrimination against the handicapped' 9 and requires affirmative action toward the advancement of handicap employment in federal agencies.2 °
Next, section 503 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 793) proscribes handicap employment discrimination by parties engaging in government contracts and
requires the inclusion of an affirmative action clause in the contract itself.2 ' Finally, section 504 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794), which is closely
discriminates against a group of persons based on handicap, gender, race, or other factors
violates the equal protection clause, a plaintiff must first contend that this classification has
been, or should be, deemed consitutionally suspect and thus demanding of strict judicial
scrutiny. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (gender inherently
suspect class demanding strict judicial scrutiny); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372
(1971) (classification based on alienage inherently suspect; demands "close judicial scrutiny"); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (classification based on race
"immediately suspect"; subject to rigid scrutiny). See generally, Dittfurth, A Theory ofEqual
Protection, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 829, 831-37 (1983) (discussing evolution of suspect class analysis in equal protection litigation).
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793, 794 (1982) (prohibiting federal agencies, contractors, and
recipients of federal funds from engaging in employment discrimination against
handicapped).
17. See Kruse v. Campbell, 431 F. Supp. 180, 188 (E.D. Va.), vacated and remanded,
434 U.S. 808 (1977) (district court's holding that handicap discrimination was violative of
equal protection clause vacated on appeal; remanded to decide on statutory grounds). In
addition to Title V, most states provide statutory guidelines proscribing employment discrimination against the handicapped. See Gittler, FairEmployment andthe Handicapped-A
Legal Perspective,27 DE PAUL L. REV. 953, 954-57 (1978) (because constitutional remedies
unsuccessful, handicapped rely on statutory remedies - federal and state).
18. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793, 794 (1982) (codification of§§ 501, 503, 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
19. See id § 791 (1982) (§ 501 of Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
20. See id § 791(b) (requiring executive agencies to maintain written affirmative action
plans for "hiring, placement, and advancement of handicapped individuals"). It was the
intent of Congress, in drafting § 501, that the federal government's obligation toward the
handicapped be great, so as to set an example for the private sector. See Rehabilitationofthe
HandicappedPrograms,1976. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor and Public Wel/are,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1502 (1976), quoted in Linn, Uncle Sam Doesn't Want You: Enteringthe
FederalStronghold of Employment DiscriminationAgainst HandicappedIndividuals, 27 DE
PAUL L. REV. 1047, 1060 (1978) (statement by Senator Williams that legislative intent was
that federal government would "act as the model employer of the handicapped").
21. See 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1982). Government contractors include companies selling
supplies and equipment to the federal government, defense contractors, construction compa-
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patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,22 prohibits recipients of federal funding from engaging in discrimination against the handicapped.23 Various federal agencies are vested with the responsibility of

nies, and space program contractors. See Bayh, Foreword to the Symposium Issue on Employment Rights of the Handicapped,27 DE PAUL L. REV. 943, 946 (1978). The provision is
applicable only to those contractors and subcontractors engaging in contracts valued in excess of $2,500. See 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1982). Where a contractor employs at least 50 people
or engages in government contracts valued in excess of $50,000, that contractor must establish and maintain a written, ongoing program of affirmative action. See 41 C.F.R. § 60741.5(a) (1984). Violation of § 503 by a government contractor could result in a partial or
complete termination of the contract. See id § 60-741.28(d).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982) (§ 601 of Title VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964). Section
601 does not expressly protect the handicapped, but merely provides: "No person in the
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance." See id Furthermore, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act which, in contrast to Title VI, deals with employment discrimination specifically,
has not been interpreted as protecting the handicapped employee. See Comment, Hidden
Handicaps.-Protection of Alcoholics, Drug Addicts, andthe Mentally Ill Against Employment
DiscriminationUnder the RehabilitationAct of 1973 andthe Wisconsin FairEmployment Act,
1983 Wis. L. REV. 725, 725 (1983); see also Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
(1982) (§ 703 of Title VII). The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, therefore, manifests Congress'
intent to extend to the handicapped similar rights as had already existed for other minorities.
See Bayh, Foreword to the Symposium Issue on Employment Rights of the Handicapped,27
DE PAUL L. REV. 943, 949-50 (1978). Senator Bayh quoted from a report on the Rehabilitation Act by the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, which said that § 504 was
patterned after § 601 not only to provide the same substantive rights, but also to provide
similar implementation by creating an identical compliance program. See id at 950; see also
S. REP. No. 1139, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1973). Consequently, § 504 regulations were
drafted to incorporate by reference the procedural requirements of Title VI regulations. See
45 C.F.R. § 84.61 (1984); see also Cook & Butler, Coverage of Employment Discrimination
Pursuantto Section 504 of the RehabilitationAct of 1973, 19 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 581, 582
(1983) (HEW's regulations enforcing § 504 identical to those implementing Title VI because
HEW recognized that § 504 "tracks Title VI almost verbatim"). In terms of government
contractors, the obligations as to the handicapped imposed by § 503 parallel the obligations
already in place as to other minorities. See Bayh, Forewordto the Symposium Issue on Employment Rights ofthe Handicapped,27 DE PAUL L. REV. 943, 950 (1978) (just as contractors
may not satisfy Title VI by hiring from only one ethnic group, § 503 cannot be satisfied by
selectively hiring only the marginally handicapped).
23. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982) (§ 504 of Rehabilitation Act). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides: "No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United
States, as defined in section 706(7) of this title, shall solely by reason of handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... ." Id Unlike
§§ 501 and 503, this provision is not limited to employment discrimination, but extends to
any unfair discrimination against the handicapped. See id; cf. Southeastern Community
College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 400 (1979) (involving application of § 504 in context of
educational opportunities for handicapped). In contrast to §§ 501 and 503, § 504 does not
require affirmative action. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 791(b) (1982) (§ 501, requiring employers
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enforcing Title V24 and have, therefore, issued administrative regulations.25 These regulations expand on the key substantive rights afforded
to submit affirmative action program plan) and id § 793(a) (§ 503, requiring insertion of
clause in government contracts whereby contractor agrees to "take affirmative action to employ" handicapped) with id. § 794 (§ 504, no requirement of affirmative action).
24. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793(b), 794 (1982) (§§ 501, 503(b), and 504 of Rehabilitation
Act). The Civil Service Commission was originally vested with administrative jurisdiction
over § 501. See id. § 791. In 1978, pursuant to a reorganization plan, all powers vested by
§ 501 in the Civil Service Commission were transferred to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). SeeReorg. Plan No. 1 of 1978,3 C.F.R. 321 (1978), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. app. at 1155 (1982). Administrative authority over § 503 is vested in the Department
of Labor. See 29 U.S.C. § 793(b) (1982) (§ 503(b), stating that complaints against federal
contractors may be filed with Department of Labor). Because § 504 addresses discrimination by employers who are recipients of financial assistance through programs conducted by
federal agencies, each administrative agency must promulgate regulations implementing
§ 504. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982) (§ 504, requiring head of each agency to promulgate enforcement regulations). In 1976, President Ford authorized the Department of Health, Education and Welfare's Office for Civil Rights to take charge of enforcing § 504. See Exec.
Order No. 11,914, 3 C.F.R. 117 (1977) (authorizing HEW to coordinate implementation of
§ 504), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,250, 3 C.F.R. 298 (1981), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d-I app. at 23-24 (1982). HEW thus issued the first regulations implementing § 504.
See 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.1-.60 (1977). Most other administrative agencies, in drafting regulations
implementing § 504, patterned their regulations after those promulgated by HEW. See
Cook & Butler, Coverage of Employment Discrimination Pursuant to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 19 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 581, 584 (1983). HEW was split into two
agencies in 1980, the Department of Education and the Department of Health and Human
Services. See Department of Education Organization Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3510 (1982).
The Department of Health and Human Services adopted the regulations drafted by HEW.
See 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.1-.61 (1984). In a move to consolidate enforcement of all non-discrimination laws, President Carter, in 1980, ordered that responsibility for coordinating § 504's
enforcement shift from the Department of Health and Human Services to the Attorney General. See Exec. Qrder No. 12,250, 3 C.F.R. 298 (1981), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-I app.
at 23-24 (1982). The order, however, specifically excludes enforcement of § 504's proscription of employment discrimination from the Attorney General's jurisdiction, thus implicitly
reserving this to the Department of Health and Human Services. See id at 300, reprinted in
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-I app. at 24 (1982) (§ 1-503 of order); cf. Exec. Order No. 11,914, 3
C.F.R. 117 (1977) (order originally vesting coordinating authority in HEW), revoked by
Exec. Order No. 12,250, 3 C.F.R. 298 (1981), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 app. at 23-24
(1982). Consequently, the Department of Health and Human Services regulations are the
most important of all agency regulations implementing § 504, because not only are they
directly descended from the original HEW regulations, but also because the department is
primarily responsible for administrative enforcement of § 504 as it pertains to employment
discrimination. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.1-.61 (1984).
25. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1613.701-.806 (1984) (EEOC regulations enforcing § 501's proscription of discrimination by federal government; applicable to all governmental agencies
within scope of § 501). Section 503 is implemented generally by the Department of Labor.
See 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-741.1 to -741.54 (1984) (Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs of the Department of Labor); see also 41 C.F.R. § 16-7.502-7 (1984) (Department of
Labor's Office of Personnel Management; mandating insurance carriers contracting with
government include clause stipulating compliance with § 503). Additionally, individual
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handicapped persons under Title V: (1) the right of otherwise qualified
handicapped persons to equal opportunity,2 6 and (2) the right to "reasonable accommodation," such as job restructuring 27 and workplace
accommodation.2 8
1. Prohibiting Discrimination Against "Qualified Handicapped
Individuals"
Section 504 states that "[n]o otherwise qualified handicapped individ29
ual" shall be subject to discrimination by a recipient of federal funding.
Requiring employers to hire "otherwise qualified" persons does not impose a duty on employers to hire handicapped persons who are unable to

governmental agencies that engage in contracts with private employers promulgate intraagency directives implementing § 503. See41 C.F.R., ch. 18, 12.801 (1984) (NASA procurement regulation directive mandating insertion of affirmative action clause in agreements
between NASA and contractors covered by § 503). Section 504 is implemented by regulations issued by each administrative agency that conducts financial assistance programs. See
7 C.F.R. §§ 156.1-.42 (1984) (Department of Agriculture); 10 C.F.R. §§ 1040.61-.74 (1984)
(Department of Energy); 14 C.F.R. §§ 1251.100-.400 (1984) (NASA); 15 C.F.R. §§ 8b.1-.26
(1984) (Department of Commerce); 18 C.F.R. §§ 1307.1-.13 (1984) (Tennessee Valley Authority); 22 C.F.R. §§ 142.1-.70 (1984) (State Department); 22 C.F.R. §§ 217.1-.61 (1984)
(Agency for International Development); 28 C.F.R. §§ 42.501-.540 (1984) (Department of
Justice); 29 C.F.R. §§ 32.1-.51 (1984) (Department of Labor); 31 C.F.R. § 51.55 (1984) (Office of Revenue Sharing); 32 C.F.R. §§ 56.1-.10 (1984) (Department of Defense); 34 C.F.R.
§§ 104.1-.61 (1984) (Department of Education); 38 C.F.R. §§ 18.401-.461 (1984) (Veterans
Administration); 41 C.F.R. §§ 29-70.100 to -70.217a (1984) (Department of Labor, specifically, agency funding of quasi-public and private non-profit organizations); 41 C.F.R.
§§ 101-8.300 to -8.313 (1984) (General Services Administration); 43 C.F.R. §§ 17.200-.280
(1984) (Department of the Interior); 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.1-.61 (1984) (Department of Health and
Human Services); 45 C.F.R. §§ 1151.1-.44 (1984) (National Endowment for the Arts); 45
C.F.R. §§ 1170.1-.55 (1984) (National Endowment for the Humanities); 45 C.F.R.
§§ 1232.1-.16 (1984) (Action); 45 C.F.R. §§ 1624.1-.8 (1984) (Legal Services Corporation).
These administrative regulations are patterned after those promulgated in 1977 by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). When discussing administrative regulations dealing with § 504, this comment will, for the sake of simplicity, cite only to the
Department of Health and Human Services' regulations, since most agencies patterned their
regulations after these.
26. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.11(a) (1984) (prohibiting employment discrimination against
qualfied handicapped persons).
27. See id § 84.12 (requiring employer to make accommodations for employee's handicap unless result is "undue hardship" on employer).
28. See id. §§ 84.21-.23 (requiring recipients of federal funds to maintain facilities such
that handicapped persons not denied fair accessibility).
29. See 29,%U.S.C. § 794 (1982); see also 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(a) (1984) ("[n]o qualified
handicapped person shall, on the basis of handicap" be discriminated against by recipients
of federal funding); id § 84.11 (a)(I) ("[n]o qualified handicapped person shall" be subject to
employment discrimination by recipient of federal funds).
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perform the job.3" Rather, discrimination is prohibited when based solely
on handicap where handicap would not preclude satisfactory job
performance. 3
The only United States Supreme Court case interpreting section 504 is
Southeastern Community College v. Davis.32 In Southeastern, an applicant

for nursing school was denied admission because she suffered a serious
hearing disability.33 According to the school, her disability would prevent
her from sufficiently functioning in the program and, ultimately, preclude
her from safely practicing as a nurse.34 The applicant sued the college, in
federal court, alleging a violation of section 504, in that she was discriminated against by a federally funded program solely by reason of her handicap.35 The district court held for the college, reasoning that the plaintiff
was not an "otherwise qualified handicapped individual" protected from
discrimination under section 504 since her handicap would prevent her
from performing sufficiently in the nursing program. 36 On appeal, the de-

30. See, e.g., Walker v. Attorney General of the United States, 572 F. Supp. 100, 102
(D.D.C. 1983) (FBI did not violate § 504 by firing employee suffering from "disqualifying
ailment" rendering him incapable of job performance); Simon v. St. Louis Co., 563 F. Supp.
76, 81 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (police department did not violate § 504 by not reinstating paraplegic
officer who could not reasonably perform job in question); Carmi v. Metropolitan St. Louis
Sewer Dist., 471 F. Supp. 119, 122 (E.D. Mo. 1979) (applicant disabled by progressive peroneal atrophy not illegally discriminated against when refused employment on basis of inability to do significant lifting required by job), aft'd, 620 F.2d 672, 676 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 499 U.S. 892 (1980).
31. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979) ("An
otherwise qualified person is one who is able to meet all . . . requirements in spite of his
handicap.").
32. 442 U.S. 397 (1979). Although Southeastern involved handicap discrimination by
an educational institution rather than by an employer, the distinction is irrelevant because
§ 504 is equally applicable to any recipient of federal funds covered by the statute. See 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1982) (§ 504 prohibits any recipient of federal funds from unfairly discriminating against handicapped in any way).
33. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 400-01 (1979). Even
with use of a hearing aid, the plaintiff could only comprehend speech if spoken directly to
her so she could lipread. If a speaker could not first get her attention, the plaintiff would be
unaware someone was speaking to her. See id at 401.
34. See id at 401.
35. See Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 424 F. Supp. 1341, 1342 (E.D.N.C.
1976), rev'd, 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 442 U.S. 397 (1979). In addition, the plaintiff alleged a denial of equal protection and due process. See id. at 1342. The district court
dismissed that claim, the court of appeals affirmed that portion of the order, and it was not
appealed to the Supreme Court. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S.
397, 404 n.3 (1979).
36. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 403 (1979). The district court defined an "otherwise qualified handicapped individual" as one who is "otherwise
able to function sufficiently in the position sought in spite of the handicap, if proper training
and facilities are suitable and available." See id. at 403.
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cision was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which
held that federal regulations implementing section 504 mandate plaintiffs
qualifications be judged by the college without regard to her disability.3 7
The Supreme Court unanimously agreed with the district court and reversed the decision of the court of appeals.38 Justice Powell reasoned that
section 504 did not prohibit the college from requiring reasonable physical
qualifications.39 Disagreeing with the appellate court's holding that the
plaintiff was "otherwise qualified" because she had satisfactory academic
and technical qualifications, 4° the Supreme Court ruled that "[a]n otherwise qualified person is one who is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his handicap.'
Under Southeastern, therefore, an
employer who discriminates based on a handicap does not violate section
504 so long as the physical qualifications upon which the decision to dis-

37. See Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 574 F.2d 1158, 1160 (4th Cir. 1978),

rev'd, 442 U.S. 397 (1979). In holding that the college should not have taken plaintiffs
handicap into account, the court of appeals reasoned that the plaintiff would be an "otherwise qualified" handicapped person if her academic and technical qualifications were up to
standard. See id at 1161. The appellate court derived its reasoning from regulations
promulgated in 1977 by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. See id at 1161;
see also 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.1-.61(1984).
38. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 414 (1979).
39. See id at 405. Discrimination resulting from reasonable qualifications does not
violate § 504. See id at 405. Rather, the Court reasoned, the statute proscribes discrimination based on the mere existence of handicap. See id at 405.
40. See Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 574 F.2d 1158, 1161 (4th Cir. 1978)
(holding plaintiff "otherwise qualified" because qualified except for handicap), rev'd, 442
U.S. 397 (1979).
41. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979). The operative
phrase in the Court's definition is "in spite of' handicap. Plaintiff was not an "otherwise
qualified" handicapped individual because she could not succeed in the program in spite of
her handicap. See id at 406. The Court states that the statute is intended to protect those
persons who either suffer impairment yet display no actual incapacity, or suffer partial impairment yet possess other abilities which allow them to fulfill the program's requirements.
See id at 405 n.6. The Supreme Court's reversal of the appellate court therefore hinged on
the different meanings of "otherwise qualified." Compare id at 405 n.6. (plaintiff not "otherwise qualified" because could not succeed in spite of her handicap) with Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 574 F.2d 1158, 1161 (4th Cir. 1978) (plaintiff "otherwise qualified"
because qualified except for her handicap), rev'd, 442 U.S. 397 (1979). Citing the regulations
promulgated by HEW in 1978, the Court noted that under the appellate court's definition of
"otherwise qualified," a blind person who was qualified to drive a bus except for his blindness would be "otherwise qualified" and the victim of discrimination under § 504 if he were
refused employment. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 407 n.7
(1979); see also 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.1-.61, app. A at 304 (1984) (Congress intended "otherwise
qualified" to mean qualified in spite of handicap-not qualified except for; consequently
regulations drop "otherwise" and just refer to "qualified handicapped individuals").
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criminate is based are reasonable.42 What constitutes reasonable physical
job qualifications inevitably turns on the facts of each individual case of
discrimination. 3
Physical job qualifications usually appear in one of two ways: (1) employers promulgate specific job qualifications that appear neutral on their
face, but in practice exclude the handicapped in disproportionate numbers, 4 or, (2) employers adopt a policy that absolutely excludes an entire
class of handicapped persons from a particular job on the basis that lack of
such handicap is a bona fide occupational qualification.4 1 In both in46
stances, there must be a showing that the qualifications are reasonable.
42. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 414 (1979) (§ 504
does not prohibit requiring "reasonable physical qualifications").
43. See Lang, Protecting the Handicappedfrom Employment Discrimination.- The JobRelatedness and Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Doctrines,27 DE PAUL L. REV. 989,
994-95 (1978) (acknowledging decisions made on case-by-case basis and calling for stricter
guidelines for judges to follow).
44. See id. at 989-90. The Fifth Circuit has labeled this practice "disparate impact
discrimination." See Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 306 (5th Cir. 1981).
When a job qualification having disparate impact against a class protected by Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act is challenged, the employer must show the qualification to be sufficiently job-related in order for it to be considered reasonable. See Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (employer's requiring high school diploma held violative of
Title VII because disproportionately excluded blacks while not being sufficiently jobrelated).
45. See Lang, Protecting the Handicappedfrom Employment Discrimination.- The JobRelatedness and Bona Fide Occupational QualicationsDoctrines,27 DE PAUL L. REV. 989,
989-90 (1978). The term "bona fide occupational qualification" is derived from cases involving the Civil Rights Act-it is not found in the language of the Rehabilitation Act. See 29
U.S.C. §§ 791, 793, 794 (1982). Obvious BFOQ's would be, for example, the requirements
that an actress or a wet-nurse be female. See Rosenfield v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d
1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 1971); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(2) (1984) (sex is BFOQ when
needed for authenticity or genuineness). A BFOQ involving a handicap may be, for example, the blanket exclusion of all blind people from a job as a bus driver. See Southeastern
Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 407 n.7 (1979) (theorizing that Congress did not
intend to disallow such job requirements when it enacted the Rehabilitation Act). In the
context of gender-based discrimination, the courts have narrowly construed the BFOQ defense of employers so that it is only available when sex is absolutely essential to the job (e.g.,
actress must be female). See Rosenfield v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1224-25 (9th
Cir. 1971). It is not available when the exclusion is based on traits (such as strength), even
though such traits are more strongly identified with one sex than the other. See id at 1225;
Lang, Protecting the Handicappedfrom Employment Discrimination. The Job-Relatedness
and Bona Fide Occupational Qualications Doctrine, 27 DE PAUL L. REV. 989, 1005-06
(1978).
46. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 414 (1979) (reasonable physical qualifications allowed under § 504).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

11

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 16 [2022], No. 2, Art. 7

[Vol. 16:433

ST MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

2.

The Duty of Reasonable Accommodation

Implicit in any finding that a person is not an otherwise qualified handicapped individual is the assumption that this person would not have become otherwise qualified had the employer simply made reasonable
accommodations.4 7 While section 504 does not expressly impose a duty of
reasonable accommodation, 48 it is well settled that one is implied. 49 Federal regulations illustrate two kinds of accommodation that must be implemented: first, the making of employee facilities accessible to the
handicapped 5" and, second, the modification or restructuring of the specific job itself." However, where such accommodations would not be reasonable, that is, where they would impose an "undue hardship" on the
employer, then they need not be made, even if the result would mean dis-

47. See Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 424 F. Supp. 1341, 1345 (E.D.N.C.
1976), rev'd, 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 442 U.S. 397 (1979). In Southeastern, the
district court said "[o]therwise qualified, can only be read to mean otherwise able to function
sufficiently in the position sought in spite of handicap, ifproper training andfacilities are
suitable and available. " Id. at 1345 (emphasis added). The Department of Health and
Human Services defines a qualified handicapped person as one who, "with reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the job in question." See 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.3(k)(1) (1984) (emphasis added).
48. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982) (words "reasonable accommodation" or similar words
absent from statute).
49. See, e.g., Majors v. Housing Auth., 652 F.2d 454, 457-58 (5th Cir. 1981) (§ 504
requires reasonable accommodation); Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d 557, 564 (5th Cir. 1980) (reasonable accommodation mandated by § 504), on remand, 516 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Tex. 1981),
aff'd, 703 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1983), af'd in part, rev'd in part, -

U.S. -

104 S. Ct. 3371, 82 L.

Ed. 2d 664 (1984); Camenisch v. University of Texas, 616 F.2d 127, 132-33 (5th Cir. 1980),
(§ 504 requires reasonable accommodation of the handicapped; providing sign language interpreters may be reasonable requirement), vacated on other grounds, 451 U.S. 390 (1981);
see also Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 307 n.21 (5th Cir. 1981) (§ 504,
like § 501, mandates reasonable accommodation).
50. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(b)(I) (1984). The Department of Health and Human Services states that "[rleasonable accommodation may include: (I) making facilities used by
employees readily accessible to and usable by handicapped persons . . . ." Id. According
to the Department's official analysis of the regulations, such accommodation may include
"physical modifications or relocation of particular offices" so they are in accessible facilities.
§§ 84.1-.61, app. A at 308 (1984). Such "access accommodation" may include the
See id.
installation of ramps, rearrangement of furniture, or the installation of special equipment.
See Gittler, Fair Employment and the Handicapped- 4 Legal Perspective, 27 DE PAUL L.
REV. 953, 960 n.21 (1978).
51. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(b)(2) (1984). Accommodation to the job itself (as opposed to
access accommodation) may include "job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, acquisitions or modification of equipment or devices, the provision of readers or interpreters, and other similar actions." Id. An important example of job restructuring is the
shifting of non-essential duties to other employees. See id §§ 84.1-.61, app. A at 308 (1984)
(analysis of § 84.12).
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crimination against a handicapped person. 2 Such a person, by definition,
would not be an otherwise qualified handicapped individual. 3
A leading Fifth Circuit case discussing reasonable accommodation is
Prewitt v. United States Postal Service.5 4 In Prewilt, a partially disabled job
applicant was denied employment as a distribution clerk by the Postal Service because medical reports indicated he would be unable to perform the
"arduous physical exertion" the job demanded. 5 The applicant sued the
Postal Service under section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, arguing
he had been illegally discriminated against. 6 The Fifth Circuit held that
52. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405 (1979) (§ 504
does not mandate "substantial modifications.., to allow disabled person to participate").
In Southeastern, the Supreme Court rejected plaintiff's argument that reasonable accommodation should include such things as substantial individual supervision and the total dispensation of requirements plaintiff could not meet. See id at 407. Federal regulations set forth
factors to be considered in determining whether accommodations are reasonable, such as:
"(1) [tihe overall size of the recipient's program with respect to number of employees,
number and type of facilities, and size of budget; (2) [tlhe type of the recipient's operation,
including the composition and structure of the recipient's work force; and (3) Itlhe nature
and cost of the accommodation needed." See 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(c) (1984). Furthermore, the
regulations make it clear that, in and of itself, the need to make reasonable accommodation
does not constitute an undue hardship on an employer. See id. § 84.12(d) (1984). In contrast to these regulations, some state statutes excuse employers from accommodations that
cause mere "hardship," rather than "undue hardship," which can be interpreted to mean
employers would not be required to make accommodations resulting in cost expenditures.
See Comment, Hidden Handicaps.- Protection of Alcoholics, Drug Addicts, and the Mentally
1Y1 Against Employment DiscriminationUnder the RehabilitationAct of 1973 and the Wisconsin FairEmployment Act, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 725, 744 n. 112.
53. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(1) (1984) (qualified handicapped person is one "who, with
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the job") (emphasis
added).
54. 662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981).
55. See id. at 297-98. Plaintiff was a disabled Vietnam veteran who suffered limited
mobility of his left arm and shoulder due to gunshot wounds. See id at 297. He passed the
standard written examination with a score placing him second on the list of eligible applicants. See id at 298. However, testimony indicated the job required "stooping, bending,
squatting, lifting up to seventy pounds, standing for long periods, stretching arms in all
directions, reaching above and below the shoulder, and some twisting of the back." See id.
at 298. A postal medical officer who examined plaintiff's medical reports concluded plaintiff
would be unable to fully perform his job. See id at 299.
56. See Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 300 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing
29 U.S.C. § 791 (1982) (prohibiting federal government from engaging in employment discrimination against qualified handicapped persons)). Plaintiff had earlier filed a complaint
with the Equal Employment Office of the Postal Service, which concluded no discrimination
had occurred, relying partly on the fact that the same post office had recently hired other
handicapped persons. See id. at 300. In response to plaintiff's petition, the Postal Service
contended plaintiff was rejected for valid medical reasons and that reevaluation of his claim
was precluded by plaintiff's refusal to obtain an additional medical examination. See id. at
300.
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section 501 requires employers to provide handicapped job applicants reafor a determination whether this
sonable accommodation and remanded
57
Service.
Postal
the
by
met
was
duty
In light of the Supreme Court's prior holding in Southeastern, the
Prewitt court acknowledged that an employer is not obligated to make accommodation for a handicapped person who would remain unqualified
even with accommodation. 58 The court denoted such a person as one confronting "insurmountable barrier discrimination."5 9 An employer is, however, obligated to reasonably accommodate victims of "surmountable
barrier discrimination," that is, employers may not reject applicants who
could perform the job if provided reasonable accommodation.6" The
Prewitt court cited administrative regulations of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) which explain what reasonable accommodation includes. 6 ' Noting that the employer may avoid the duty to accommodate if it would cause undue hardship, the court recognized that the
employer bears the burden of proving such hardship.6 2
57. See id at 297. While the Postal Service argued a major reason for rejecting plaintiff
was his inability to lift his arm above his shoulder, the court weighed heavily the admission
of one defense witness that this disability would become moot if the post office accommoat 297.
dated by simply lowering the shelves where plaintiff would work. See id.
58. See id at 307. (Rehabilitation Act does not mandate redress of "insurmountable
barrier" discrimination). The court derived this rule from the Supreme Court's holding in
Southeastern that, in the context of an educational institution's denying admission based on
handicap, § 504 only prohibits discrimination against persons who can rise to the level of
"otherwise qualified" with reasonable accommodation. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979), citedin Prewitt v. United States Postal Service, 662
F.2d 292, 307 (5th Cir. 1981). A handicapped person who requires unreasonable accommodation, or who with reasonable accommodation would remain unable to meet the requirements, is not otherwise qualified and is subject to "insurmountable barrier handicap
discrimination." See Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 307 (5th Cir. 1981).
The Prewitt court expressly stated that the difference between the educational opportunity
discrimination in Southeastern under § 504 and the employment discrimination in the instant case under § 501 is immaterial. See id at 307.
59. See Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 307 (5th Cir. 1981).
60. See id at 305. The court stated: "even if Prewitt cannot so perform, he might still
be entitled to relief if he was a victim of 'surmountable barrier' discrimination, i e., if he was
rejected even though he could have performed the essentials of the job if afforded reasonable accommodation." Id.at 305.
at 308 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704 (1984)). The EEOC guidelines contain
61. See id.
provisions for both access accommodation and specific job accommodation, such as "job
restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices . . . and other similar actions." See 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704(b) (1984). These
regulations also allow employers the defense of undue hardship. See id § 1613.704(a).
62. See Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 308 (5th Cir. 1981). The
burden is justifiably on the employer because the plaintiff would ordinarily not be in as good
a position to know the essentials of the job. See id at 308. Also, the employer can look to
the experiences of itself or other employers in determining how reasonable such accommo-
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THE TEXAS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ACT

Augmenting the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act.63 Passed in 1983 by a special session of the
Texas Legislature, the statute creates a commission which is charged with
enforcing the prohibition of certain kinds of discriminatory employment
practices.64 The most notable difference between this act and the federal
Rehabilitation Act is that the Texas law applies to a much broader class of
employers. The federal statute applies only to federal agencies, federal
contractors, and recipients of federal funding.6 5 Under the Texas act however, any employer who employs at least fifteen persons on a regular basis
is covered.66 Furthermore, the Act forbids discrimination by employment
agencies and labor unions.6 7
A.

Administrative Review of Complaints

The Texas statute creates a six member Commission on Human Rights
(the Commission), 68 which is empowered to hear complaints brought directly to it or referred by the federal Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. 69 The Act also empowers local governments to create local
commissions which may receive direct complaints, have complaints referred to them by the state Commission, and refer cases to the state
Commission.7 °
dation would be; plaintiff would not be in a position to do this. See id.
at 308. In addition,
employers are often made aware of ways to accommodate by private and government
sources. See id at 308; Note, Accommodating the Handicapped: RehabilitatingSection 504
After "Southeastern," 80 COLUM. L. REV. 171, 187-88 (1980).
63. See TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k (Vernon Pamph. Supp. 1984).
64. See id § 1.02(2) (general purposes of Act); id.
§§ 5.01-. 10 (article 5 of Act, containing substantive provisions proscribing discrimination in employment).
65. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793, 794 (1982) (Title V of Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
prohibiting federal governmental agencies, federal contractors, and recipients of federal
funds from engaging in discrimination, including employment discrimination, against
handicapped).
66. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 2.01(5) (Vernon Pamph. Supp. 1984).
The Act defines "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who
has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the
current or preceding calendar year and any agent of that person." Id. A "person" in the
above definition is defined broadly to include such entities as corporations, associations, and
the state. See id § 2.01( 11).
67. See id §§ 5.02-.03.
68. See id.
§ 3.01(a).
69. See id.
§ 3.02(4) (power of Commission to "cooperate or contract with" federal governmental agencies); see also HOUSE COMM. ON STATE AFFAIRS, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. H.B.

14, 68th Leg. (1983) (purpose of Commission to receive complaints referred by federal
EEOC, pursuant to Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964).
70. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, §§ 4.02-.04 (Vernon Pamph. Supp.
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Article 6 of the Act sets forth the procedure for review of discrimination
complaints by the Commission. 7 ' An aggrieved party must first file a written complaint within six months of the alleged violations; the Commission
must then notify the employer of the complaint within ten days and must
attempt to bring about voluntary resolution of the dispute. 2 If that fails,
the Commission will investigate the complaint to determine whether there
is reasonable cause to suspect a violation has occurred.7 3 If so, the Commission must first attempt to remedy the situation through "conference,
conciliation, and persuasion" before seeking judicial action. 4
B. Judicial Action
Article 7 of the Texas statute provides for judicial enforcement of substantive rights.7 5 In the event that the Commission was unable to remedy
a bona fide complaint, it may bring suit against the employer in district
court, and the complainant may intervene.76 If, on the other hand, the
Commission either dismissed the complaint or failed to timely act on it,
the complainant may bring suit, and the court may allow the Commission
to intervene. 77 In either case, trial is de novo and findings of the Commisssion are not binding on the court. 78 The Act enumerates several remedies available to the complainant, including hiring, reinstatement or
promotion, back pay, court costs, and attorneys' fees. 79
C.

Substantive Rights

Discriminatory practices prohibited by the Texas act are contained in
article 5.80 Employers are prohibited from refusing to hire, discharging, or
otherwise discriminating against a person regarding terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment based on handicap, race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or age. 8' Segregation or classification of employees or applicants based on one of the classes is prohibited if it would have an adverse

1984) (political subdivisions may create local commissions with similar powers to state
Commission).
71. See id §6.01.
72. See id § 6.01(a).
73. See id. § 6.01(a).
74. See id. § 6.01(c).
75. See id § 7.01.
76. See id § 7.01(a).
77. See id. § 7.01(a).
78. See id. § 7.01(h).
79. See id § 7.01(d) (court not limited to remedies listed in statute).
80. See id §§ 5.01-. 10.
81. See id. § 5.01(1).
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affect. 2 Likewise, employment agencies and labor organizations are prohibited from engaging in such practices.83 There is a provision prohibiting
discrimination which excludes such persons from training programs and
apprenticeships; this provision, 84
however, is made conspicuously inapplicable to handicapped employees.
Two provisions of article 5 provide employers with a viable defense to
charges of employment discrimination. One provision allows discrimination which results from an employer's use of "a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business .
*..
,85 Another provision permits employers to engage in
otherwise illegal discrimination so long as "the employer establishes that
the practice is not intentionally devised or operated to contravene the prohibition of this Act and is justified by business necessity."'86 As in other
jurisdictions, litigation will undoubtedly arise in Texas over the "business
necessity clause ' 87 and the "bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ)
clause." 88
82. See id § 5.01(2).
83. See id. §§ 5.02-.03.
84. See id § 5.04 ("Training Programs"). This provision states that "it is an unlawful
employment practice ... to discriminate against an individual because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in admission to or participation in a program established to
provide apprenticeship, on-the-job, or other training or retraining opportunities." Id. § 5.04.
85. See id § 5.07(a)(1).
86. See id. § 5.07(a)(7).
87. See, e.g., Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 574 F.2d 1158, 1162 (4th Cir.
1978) (litigating whether § 504 requires employer provide certain accommodations "even
when such modifications become expensive"), rev'd, 442 U.S. 397 (1979); E.E. Black, Ltd. v.
Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1104 (D. Hawaii 1980) (litigating whether exclusion of handicapped applicant because of risk of future injury is legitimate business necessity); Advocates
for the Handicapped v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 385 N.E.2d 39, 42 (11. App. 1978) (litigating
whether handicapped applicant, uninsurable under employer's self-insured plan, can be rejected out of business necessity), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981 (1979); see also TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 5.07(a)(7) (Vernon Pamph. Supp. 1984) (business necessity exception in Texas act).
88. See, e.g., Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561, 563-64 (8th Cir.
1977) (litigating whether age is legitimate BFOQ for job as test pilot); Neeld v. American
Hockey League, 439 F. Supp. 459, 462 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (litigating whether being fully
sighted is legitimate BFOQ for employment as professional hockey player); Fraser Shipyards, Inc. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1809, 1810 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1976) (litigating whether policy excluding diabetic from job
as welder is legitimate BFOQ); see also TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 522 1k, § 5.07(a)(1)
(Vernon Pamph. Supp. 1984) (BFOQ provision of Texas statute).
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ACT IN LIGHT
OF THE FEDERAL REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973
The Commission on Human Rights Act will significantly impact the law
of handicap employment discrimination in at least two ways. First, it provides state and local forums for administrative disposition of complaints,89
whereas its predecessor contained no provision establishing an administrative commission, but merely set forth substantive rights.9" While the federal law does provide for administrative adjudication in some instances, 9 1
the statute only applies to a limited class of employers, 92 and it is somewhat unclear as to whether a private right of action inures to the complainant. 93 Second, because the Texas statute applies to a significantly broader

89. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, §§ 3.01-.02 (Vernon Pamph. Supp.
1984) (creation and powers of Commission).
90. See Act of May 29, 1975, ch. 352, § 2, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 939 (codified at TEX.
HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 121.003(f) (Vernon 1980)), repealed by Act of July 7, 1983, ch. 7,
§ 10.03(c), 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws, Gen. & Spec. 37, 57 (codified as Commission on Human
Rights Act, at TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 10.03(c) (Vernon Pamph. Supp.
1984)). The prior law stated:
An employer who conducts business in this state may not discriminate in his or her
employment practices against a handicapped person on the basis of the handicap if the
person's ability to perform the task required by a job is not impaired by the handicap
and the person is otherwise qualified for the job.
ld While the new statute repealed the above provision, it left standing another provision
concerning employment of the handicapped. It states:
It is the policy of the state that the blind, the visually handicapped and the otherwise
physically disabled be employed by the state, by political subdivisions of the state, in
the public schools, and in all other employment supported in whole or in part by public
funds on the same terms and conditions as the able-bodied, unless it is shown that the
particular disability prevents the performance of the work involved.
TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 121.003(g) (Vernon 1980). There is obvious overlap between
this provision and the new statute. Compare id. § 121.003(g) (applicable to state, its political
subdivisions, public schools, and recipients of state funding) with TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 5221k, § 2.01(5) (Vernon Pamph. Supp. 1984) (Commission on Human Rights Act
applicable to employers, including political subdivisions, state agencies, and public institutions of higher learning). The older provision conceivably might apply to a narrow class of
employers not within the scope of the Commission on Human Rights Act, namely state
instrumentalities and recipients of state funding that do not employ 15 persons on a regular
basis. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 2.01(5) (Vernon Pamph. Supp. 1984)
(Commission on Human Rights Act applicable only to employers having 15 or more
employees).
91. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(l), (2) (1982) (provision in Rehabilitation Act of 1973 incorporating administrative remedies available under Civil Rights Act of 1964); see also 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1982) (provision of Civil Rights Act of 1964 setting forth administrative
remedies; appeal to EEOC).
92. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793, 794 (1982) (Title V of Rehabilitation Act applies only to
government agencies, federal government contractors, and recipients of federal funds).
93. See id §§ 793-794 (§§ 503 and 504 are silent as to whether statute creates private
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range of employers, substantially greater numbers of handicapped people
will be brought within statutory protection.94 The statute may be unable
to fully effectuate its purpose unless the courts cautiously apply the two
major exceptions to the general proscription of discrimination. 95 Of even
greater significance is the absence from the statute of any provision expressly mandating that employers provide reasonable accommodation for
handicapped employees.9 6
A.

Exceptions.- Bona Fide OccupationalQualificationsand the Business
Necessity Defense

The Texas act expressly allows employers to discriminate against a
handicapped person where the absence of such a handicap is a bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ). 97 Generally, a BFOQ is a job requireright of action). Since federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, plaintiff must show that
Congress intended the statute forming the basis of the suit to create a private remedy. See
Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1078 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 889
(1980). Absent a private right of action, proper adjudication under §§ 503 and 504 would
reside solely in the administrative forums, with available remedial action limited to dissolution of the government contract or discontinuance of federal funds, respectively. See id at
1080; see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 793-794 (1982) (§§ 503 and 504 of Rehabilitation Act). Most
courts and commentators, however, have noted an implied private right of action. See
Camenisch v. University of Texas, 616 F.2d 127, 135-36 (5th Cir. 1980) (Rehabilitation Act
does not mandate exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to suit), remanded without
reaching issue,451 U.S. 390 (1981); Doe v. Colautti, 592 F.2d 704, 708 (3d Cir. 1979) (private
right of action exists under § 504); United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413, 415
(8th Cir. 1977) (private right of action implied); Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d
1277, 1285 (7th Cir. 1977) (Congress intended private right of action). See generallyl Note,
Private Rights ofActionfor HandicappedPersons Under Section 503 of the RehabilitationAct,
13 VAL. U.L. REV. 453, 468-96 (1979) (discussing forms of private judicial action under
§ 503; mandamus proceedings, judicial review of administrative proceedings, and direct judicial action).
94. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 2.01(5) (Vernon Pamph. Supp. 1984)
(Commission on Human Rights Act applicable to all employers having 15 employees on
regular basis).
95. See id § 5.07(1) (exception for bona fide occupational qualification); id § 5.07(7)
(defense of "business necessity").
96. See id §§ 5.01-.10 (article 5, containing Act's substantive law on discrimination,
contains no mention of reasonable accommodation); see also id § 1.04(b) (proscription of
discrimination "on basis of handicap" does not include implicit requirement of reasonable
accommodation).
97. See id § 5.07(a)(1). The provision states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this article, it is not an unlawful employment
practice.
(1) for an employer to hire and to employ employees, for an employment agency to
classify or refer for employment an individual, for a labor organization to classify its
members or to classify or refer for employment an individual, or for an employer, labor
organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling an apprenticeship, on-
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ment expressly excluding an entire class of persons, such as a requirement
that one "must be a female" or "must be under the age of 40." 98 Similarly,
under the Texas act an employer would probably be able to categorically
exclude an entire class of handicapped persons by use of a BFOQ, since
the statute defines a BFOQ as excluding a "group," rather than
individuals.9 9
Advocates of employment rights for the handicapped greet BFOQ's with
apprehension because often there may be individual members of the excluded class who, in spite of their handicap, could satisfactorily perform
the job."° In contrast to Texas, Wisconsin, for example, recognized the
potential unfairness of BFOQ's and did not include a provision permitting
their use in the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act.' ° ' The net effect of the
BFOQ provision in Texas will depend on whether the courts require strict

the-job, or other training or retraining program to admit or employ an individual in its
program, on the basis of handicap, religion, sex, national origin, or age, if handicap,
religion, sex, national origin, or age is a bonafide occupationalqualfication reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of the particular business or enterprise.
Id.§ 5.07(a)(1) (emphasis added).
98. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859, 862 (7th Cir. 1974)
(employer had blanket policy refusing to employ bus drivers over age 40), cert. denied,419
U.S. 1122 (1975); Weeks v. Southwestern Bell Tel. & Tel., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969)
(BFOQ excluding all women unacceptable unless can prove substantially all women unable
to efficiently perform job); Fraser Shipyards, Inc. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human
Relations, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1809, 1810 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1976) (employer categorically excluded diabetics from employment as welders).
99. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 2.01(l)(B) (Vernon Pamph. Supp.
1984). The provision states: "In this Act... 'Bona fide occupational qualification' means a
qualification. . . for which there is a factual basis for believing that a person of the excluded
group would be unable to perform satisfactorily the duties of the job with safety or efficiency." Id. (emphasis added).
100. See Gittler, FairEmployment and the Handicapped- A Legal Perspective,27 DE
PAUL L. REV. 953, 977-81 (1978).
101. Compare TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 522 1k, § 5.07(a)(1) (Vernon Pamph.
Supp. 1984) (BFOQ provision in Texas Commission on Human Rights Act) with Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 111.34(b), (c) (West Supp. 1983-1984) (provision of Wisconsin Fair Employment Act
discussing exceptions to proscription against handicap employment discrimination; evaluation must be on individual basis; general, categorical exclusions not permitted as to certain
exceptions). Even before the enactment of the cited Wisconsin provision, the Wisconsin
Fair Employment Code was construed liberally to effectuate its purpose of fostering full
employment of the handicapped. See Fraser Shipyards, Inc. v. Department of Indus., Labor
& Human Relations, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1809, 1810 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1976). In
Fraser,an employer's policy of refusing to hire diabetics as welders, because many diabetics
are prone to blacking out, was held violative of the state's fair employment statute. See id at
1810. The policy was challenged by two welders who had never blacked out. See id at
1810. The court ruled that the law should be liberally construed to the advantage of the
protected class, and that an overbroad job qualification such as this was precisely what the
law discouraged. See id at 1810.
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proof of both job relatedness and the factual basis for inferring that substantially all of the members of the class to which
an individual plaintiff
02
belongs would be unable to perform the job.1
In addition to allowing discrimination based on BFOQ's, the Act also
permits an employer to engage in otherwise prohibited discrimination if
exercising good faith and "justified by business necessity." 1 °3 While many
actions might arguably be justified by business necessity, under federal law
the "business necessity" defense is only allowable as against the duty to
provide reasonable accommodation.'" However, no mention of a duty of
reasonable accommodation is made in article 5 of the Texas act; 10 5 the
business necessity clause is not made specifically referable to a duty of
reasonable accommodation. 0 6 Instead, the provision allows an employer,
based on a showing of business necessity, to engage in "any practice" having discriminatory effect.' 0 7 The significance of this business necessity defense will be determined by how courts will define business necessity. In
the context of reasonable accommodation under federal law, "business necessity" has been equated with factors causing "undue hardship" on an

102. Cf.Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561, 563-64 (8th Cir. 1977)
(involving employers use of age as BFOQ for employment as test pilot). In Houghton, an
opinion written by retired U.S. Supreme Court Justice Clark, the BFOQ was held invalid
because medical testimony and statistical studies indicated there was not a sufficient factual
basis for believing that a 52 year old man could not perform the job safely and efficiently.
See id at 563-64. The court emphasized it was the employer's burden to prove that such a
factual basis existed. See id at 564.
103. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 522 1k, § 5.07(a)(7). The provision provides:
(a) Nothwithstanding any other provision of this article, it is not unlawful employment
practice...
(7) for an employer to engage in any practice that has a discriminatory effect and that
would otherwise be prohibited by this Act if the employer establishes that the practice is
not intentionally devised or operated to contravene the prohibitions of this Act and is
justified by business necessity.
Id.(emphasis added). This provision was probably the result of a compromise, as it did not
appear in the bill as originally proposed in the House. See HOUSE COMM. ON STATE AFFAIRS, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. H.B. 14, 68th Leg. (1983) (§ 5.07(a)(7) did not appear in original
bill).
104. See 41 C.F.R. § 60.741.6(d) (1984) (Department of Labor regulations absolving
employers of duty to reasonably accommodate if can show hardship arising from "business
necessity").
105. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, §§ 5.01-. 10 (Vernon Pamph. Supp.
1984) (article does not create duty of reasonable accommodation).
106. See id § 5.07(a)(7). Rather, the term "business necessity" does not only refer to
the one "practice" of refusing reasonable accommodation. See id.§ 5.07(a)(7).
107. See id § 5.07(a)(7). Indeed, one may draw a tenable inference that an employer
may, by showing some business necessity, refuse to hire a handicapped person who does not
even need accommodation. Cf.id § 5.07(a)(7) (depending on how "business necessity" defined, provision allows any discriminatory practice justified by business necessity).
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employer, 0 8 such as the size of the business or enterprise, its budget, and
the number of employees. 0 9
B.

ReasonableAccommodation

In contrast to federal law, the Commission on Human Rights Act does
not expressly mandate that employers provide reasonable accommodation
for the handicapped employee."' Under federal law, a handicapped person may be qualified for a job, and thus protected from discrimination,
even though he requires reasonable accommodation by the employer."'I
Unlike the federal law, however, the Texas statute does not construe a
qualified handicapped individual to be one who might need reasonable
accommodation." 2 Furthermore, article 5 of the Act, which contains the

108. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.1-.61, app. A at 308 (1984) (official analysis of 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.12(c)). The term "business necessity" is used by other agencies to denote the same
factors this agency lists in § 84.12(c) to illustrate "undue hardship." See id.
109. See id. § 84.12(c) (factors to be considered in determining whether duty of reasonable accommodation causes undue hardship). Undue hardship varies from case to case;
what is reasonable for a large corporation may not be reasonable for a small grocery store.
See id. §§ 84.1-.6 1, app. A at 303. But see Note, Affirmative Action Toward Hiring Qualied
HandicappedIndividuals, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 785, 814-15 (1976) (arguing reasonableness
should be defined on societal basis, rather than by measuring capabilities of individual
employers).
110. Compare TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, §§ 5.01-.10 (Vernon Pamph.
Supp. 1984) (article of new Texas act containing substantive discrimination law does not
require reasonable accommodation) with Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292,
307 n. 21 (5th Cir. 1981) (§ 504 mandates reasonable accommodation).
111. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 403 (1979). The
Supreme Court held that an otherwise qualified handicapped individual is one "able to
function sufficiently in the position sought in spite of the handicap if proper trainingand
facilities are suitable and available." Id. at 403 (emphasis added); see also 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.3(k)(1) (1984). The Department of Health and Human Services makes reference to
reasonable accommodation in its definition of "qualified handicapped person": "[w]ith respect to employment, a handicapped person who, with reasonableaccommodation, can perform the essential functions of the job in question." Id. (emphasis added).
112. Compare 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(1) (1984) (employer must provide reasonable accommodation before can judge whether handicapped employee qualified) with TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 1.04(b) (Vernon Pamph. Supp. 1984) (construing use of term "because of handicap" in article 5; does not require reasonable accommodation before judging
whether handicapped employee qualified). The Texas provision reads: "In Article 5, 'because of handicap' or 'on the basis of handicap' refers to discrimination because of or on the
basis of a physical or mental condition that does not impair an individual's ability to reasonably perform a job." TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 1.04(b) (Vernon Pamph.
Supp. 1984). Had the legislature intended to expressly create a right to reasonable accommodation, as exists in federal law, the provision might have been drafted as such: In article
5, "because of handicap" or "on the basis of handicap" refers to discrimination because of or
on the basis of a physical or mental condition that, with reasonableaccommodation, does not
impair an individual's ability to reasonably perform a job. Cf. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(1) (1984)

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol16/iss2/7

22

Stahl: Fair Employement of the Handicapped in Texas.

19851

COMMENTS

substantive provisions on discrimination, makes no mention of a duty of
reasonable accommodation." 13
A plaintiff could reasonably argue, however, that the Texas act implies a
duty of reasonable accommodation by virtue of two provisions pertaining
to procedural aspects of the Act.'" 4 Under article 6, the Act says that the
Commission "must take into account the reasonableness of the cost of any
work place accommodation."" 5 A similar provision is contained in article
7 pertaining to judicial, rather than administrative, action." 16 Common
sense dictates that an employer would have no need to defend his objection to accommodation if he were not under a duty to provide it. Moreover, a commonly applied rule of statutory construction states that
remedial legislation, such as the Texas act, should be construed most favorably to the class it seeks to protect." 7
Nevertheless, an employer could counter the above argument by pointing out that procedures set forth in arlicles 6 and 7 apply not only to complaints based on the substantive rights created by the Act, but also to
complaints arising out of federal substantive law, referred to the Commission by the EEOC." 18 Consequently, the references to the duty of reasonable accommodation made in these two provisions would only be
applicable where the duty had already been created: in complaints arising
out of the Rehabilitation Act, referred to the Commission by the EEOC,

(federal provision construing a qualified person to be one who might need reasonable
accommodation).
113. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, §§ 5.01-.10 (Vernon Pamph. Supp.
1984).
114. See id. § 6.01(d) (permitting defense of undue hardship in administrative review of
discrimination complaint); id § 7.01(f) (permitting defense of undue hardship at judicial
review of complaint).
115. See id § 6.01(d).
116. See id § 7.01(f). This provision reads: "In the case of handicapped employees or
applicants, the court must take into account the undue hardship defense, including the reasonableness of the cost of any necessary work place accommodation and the availability of
alternatives or other appropriate relief." Id. § 7.01(f) (emphasis added).
117. See Texas Employment Comm'n v. Ryan, 481 S.W.2d 172, 176 (Tex. Civ. AppTexarkana 1972, writ reed n.r.e.) ("It is a familiar rule that social and remedial legislation
will be construed liberally to effectuate its purpose."); see also Lang, Protectingthe Handicappedfrom Employment Discrimination.- The Job-Relatedness and Bona Fide Occupational
Qualifcation Doctrines,27 DE PAUL L. REV. 989, 1010 (1978) (remedial legislation should be
construed more favorably to protected class).
118. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 3.02(4) (Vernon Pamph. Supp. 1984)

(authorizing Commission to accept complaints referred by federal agencies); see also HouSE
COMM. ON STATE AFFAIRS, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. H.B. 14, 68th Leg. (1983) (explaining back-

ground of Act). According to the Bill Analysis, one reason for creating the Human Rights
Commission was to provide a state enforcement mechanism to receive handicap discrimination complaints based onfederal statutes that were originally brought to the EEOC. See id
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and not in complaints arising out of the Human Rights Act, where the duty
had not been created. The fact that the legislature could have, but did not,
expressly create a duty of reasonable accommodation anywhere in the
Commission on Human Rights Act may be dispositive." '9
V.

CONCLUSION

The enactment, in 1973, of the federal Rehabilitation Act heralded the
beginning of significant advances toward the goal of fair employment of
the "physically challenged." The enactment, ten years later, of the Texas
Commission on Human Rights Act may allow many more people the opportunity to prove "handicap" is indeed a misnomer. Yet, in attempting to
formulate an equitable balance between the potentially adverse interests of
employers and the handicapped, the Texas Legislature may have underestimated the ability of bona fide occupational qualifications and the "business necessity defense" to thwart the overall purpose of the Act.
Moreover, unless a duty of reasonable accommodation is read into the
Texas statute, many who would otherwise succeed at a job may be unable
to gain employment.

119. Cf TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, §§ 5.01-.10 (Vernon Pamph. Supp.
1984) (legislature did not create duty of reasonable accommodation); Allen Sales & Servicenter v. Ryan, 525 S.W.2d 863, 866 (Tex. 1975) (legislature presumed to have acted with
"full knowledge of existing condition of law"). But see Holland v. Boeing Co., 583 P.2d 621,
622-23 (Wash. 1978) (though state statute does not expressly impose duty of reasonable accommodation, duty must be implied to effectuate purposes of statute).
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